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Abstract 
Dependability modeling and evaluation is 
aimed at investigating that a system per­
forms its function correctly in time. A usual 
way to achieve a high reliability is to design 
redundant systems that contain several repli­
cas of the same subsystem. In order to pro­
vide compactness in system representation, 
parametric system modeling has been inves­
tigated in the ,iterature: a set of replicas of 
a given subsystem is parameterized so that 
only one representative instance is explicitly 
included in the model. While modeling as­
pects can be suitably addressed by these ap­
proaches, analytical tools working on para­
metric characterizations are often more dif­
ficult to be defined; the standard approach 
consists in "unfolding" the parametric model, 
in order to exploit standard analysis algo­
rithms working at the unfolded "ground" 
level. In the present paper we consider the 
formalism of Parametric Fault Tree (PFT) 
and we show how it can be related to Proba­
bilistic Horn Abduction (PHA). Since PHA is 
a framework where both modeling and anal­
ysis can be performed in a restricted first­
order language, we aim at showing that the 
conversion of a PFT into a PHA theory al­
lows for an approach to dependability analy­
sis directly exploiting parametric representa­
tion. We will show that classical qualitative 
and quantitative dependability measures can 
be characterized within PHA; this makes the 
PHA framework a candidate for PFT analy­
sis, where also posterior probability computa­
tion (often neglected in standard Fault Tree 
analysis) can be naturally performed. A sim­
ple example of a multi-processor system with 
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several replicated units is used to illustrate 
the approach. 
1 PARAMETRIC FAULT TREE 
Parametric Fault Trees (PFT) have been introduced 
in [2] as a way of efficiently modeling redundant sys­
tems for dependability analysis. The basic idea behind 
PFT stems from the observation that often, due to the 
redundancy of the system to be modeled, a FT may 
contain several similar subtrees. To make the descrip­
tion more compact, the similar subtrees may be folded 
and parameterized, so that only one representative is 
explicitly included in the model; at the same time, the 
identity of each replica is maintained through a param­
eter value. A parameter is declared in a node called 
a replicator node or simply replicator. Each replicator 
generates as many subtrees as the possible combina­
tions of values of the parameters declared in the node. 
Despite its name, an FT is often represented as a DAG 
(when a basic event is shared by several subtrees). The 
same holds for a PFT; more formally a PFT is a bipar­
tite DAG whose nodes are either events (E) or gates 
(9). Besides events and gates, a PFT comprises the 
following primitive elements: types T, event classes 
EC, parameters P and failure rates R1 
Event nodes E are represented as boxes on the PFT. 
As in classical FT, there is a single node in E, called 
the TE (top event), which is not input to any gate 
node and represents the system failure. Basic events 
BE are events for which no further subdivision is nec­
essary (system components) and, therefore, they are 
not output to any gate node; BE are denoted by a cir­
cle next to the event box. 
Gates 9 can belong to one of the following categories: 
AND, OR, implicit (k : n); they are denoted using 
classical gate notation. 
T is a set of finite and disjoint non-empty sets called 
1 A more formal definition can be found in [2]. 
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Figure 1: A multiprocessor system. 
types. 
EC is the set of event classes, i.e. a collection of similar 
events. BEC E EC is the subset including only classes 
of basic events. If e E E, then [ e J denotes the event 
class to which e belongs. 
P is a set of typed parameters. Parametric events iden­
tify a generic event in a given class. A parameter must 
be associated with a type from T and T, will denote 
the type of a parameter x. A parameter must be de­
clared in exactly one event node. Event nodes where a 
parameter is declared are called replicators (RE) and 
are represented as dashed boxes. 
R is a function assigning to each basic event class a 
failure rate, needed for quantitative analysis purposes. 
If be E BE, then A[be] will denote the failure rate of 
the class to which be belongs. In the following, we will 
assume constant failure rates with an exponential dis­
tribution (i.e. the probability of failure of component 
be at time t is given by p = 1 - c-"1••11 ) . 
A constraint imposed by the PFT formalism is that 
implicit (k : n) gates must have just one input event 
which is a replicator; this kind of gate is adopted to 
model voting mechanisms2. 
As an example, consider the multiprocessor system 
sketched in figure 1 (the example is taken from [2] and 
it is an extension of another one originally proposed 
in [7]); it is composed by n independent subsystems 
S1 , . . .  , Sn. Each subsystemS; (i = 1, ... , n) is com­
posed by one processor P; one local memory M; and 
m replicated mirrored disk units D;,j, where the index 
i = 1, ... , n refers to the subsystem and the index 
j = 1, ... , m numbers the disk replica inside the sub-
system. The system redundancy is augmented by a 
shared common memory M g that can replace any sin­
gle local memory M;. A single bus B connects the 
n subsystems and the shared common memory. The 
complete system failure occurs when either the bus B 
2Following dependability conventions, a (k : n) voting 
means that at least k elements over a total of n has to 
be working in order to have a (sub )-system working, i.e. 
n - k + 1 elements over n must fail, in order to produce a 
failure. 
Figure 2: PFT for the system of fig. 1 
Table 1: Failure rates for the multiprocessor system 
model. 
Component I Failure rate (fault/hour) I 
processor 5 * 10 ., 
disk 8 * 10 -o 
local memory 3 * 10 -o 
shared memory 3 * 10 -o 
bus 2 * 10 -" 
fails or with a (k : n) voting mechanism over the n 
subsystems. Each subsystem fails if the processor fails 
or all the disks fail or both the local as well as the 
shared memory fail. 
The PFT for the example is drawn in Figure 2 (we 
emphasize with different gray levels the scope of each 
parameter). The set of types T contains two elements: 
the type T1 of cardinality n identifying the subsystems 
and the type T2 of cardinality m identifying the disk 
units inside each subsystem. The event classes EC cor­
respond to the elementary components (processor P, 
memory M, disk D, bus B) and modules obtained by 
the combination of elementary components (disk mod­
ule DM, memory module M M and subsystem S). 
The element of class P (processor) pertaining to sub­
system i E T1 has label P(i), while D(i,j) indicates 
the event: "failure of disk j E T2 in subsystem i E T1". 
Similarly M(i) indicates the failure of local memory 
for subsystem i. B or M9 are unique events in their 
classes and do not need to be specified by any param­
eter. In figure 2, the parameter i of type T1 is declared 
in the replicator labeled S(i), and the parameter j of 
type T2 is declared in the replicator labeled D(i,j). 
Function R defines the failure rates of disks (R(D)), 
processors (R(P)), memories (R(M) and R(M9)) and 
the bus (R(B)). Table 1 shows the values adopted in 
the example. 
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The structural complexity of the PFT of Figure 2 does 
not depend on the number of elements inside each 
event class. Exactly the same model structure can 
represent any number of subsystems and any number 
of disks by suitably setting the cardinality of the cor­
responding types T1 and T2. 
2 PFT AND PROBABILISTIC 
HORN ABDUC TION 
Probabilistic Horn Abduction (PHA) has been intro­
duced by Poole as a way of characterizing probabilis­
tic reasoning in terms of the notion of abductive ex­
planation [9, 10). A major feature of the formalim is 
the use of a first-order Horn language that allows for 
a compact representation of probabilistic knowledge, 
through the use of variables and functions as argu­
ments of predicates. In fact, PHA can be viewed as a 
way of extending an important probabilistic formalism 
like Bayesian Networks (BN) beyond a propositional 
language [8, 10]. 
From the dependability point of view, we have pre­
viously shown that any standard FT can be suitably 
modeled by means of a BN [4, 3]; in particular a BN 
may be adopted in order to augment both the model­
ing and the analysis power of a standard FT. However, 
being a BN a propositional formalism, as in the case 
of a standard FT, the size of the model may become 
considerable when modeling a redundant system with 
several replicas. In our multiprocessor example, any 
additional replica of a subsystem i E T1 implies that 
m + 5 (m E Tz) more event nodes (and 3 more gates) 
have to be added to a standard FT (i.e. m + 5 more 
nodes have to added to the corresponding BN). It fol­
lows that in a highly redundant system, the number of 
nodes (in either a FT or a BN) can become quite large. 
A PFT has no such problems, since the structure com­
plexity is independent from the number of replicas. 
The aim of the paper is to show that it is possible to 
convert a PFT into a corresponding PHA theory where 
the parametric representation can be (at least par­
tially) preserved; in addition, PHA-based algorithms 
such as best-first top-down search of explanations [9] 
can be fruitfully adopted in order to compute depend­
ability measures. Qualitative measures such as min­
imal cut-sets (MCS) or quantitative measures (such 
as system unreliability, posterior probability of faults, 
etc ... ) can be computed within the PHA framework. 
This provides the PFT formalism with an effective 
analysis methodology. 
First of all, let us briefly remind the basics of PHA 
(see [10] for more details). 
A disjoint declaration is of the form 
disjoint([h1 : Pl, ... hn : PnJl 
where hi are atoms (called hypotheses), Pi are real 
numbers 0 :::; Pi :::; 1 such that I:i Pi = 1. Any variable 
appearing in one hi must appear in all of the hj and 
the declaration implies the clause false+- hi II hj for 
i j j. Number Pi denotes the (prior) probability of hi. 
A Probabilistic Horn Abduction Theory is a col­
lection of definite clauses and disjoint declarations such 
that a ground atom h can be instance of a hypothesis 
only in one disjoint declaration. 
An Abductive scheme is a pair (F, H) where F is 
a set of Horn clauses and H a set of atoms; let H' be 
the set of ground instances of elements of H. If g is a 
closed formula, an explanation of g from scheme (F, H) 
is D � H' such that F U D I= g and F U D JC f alse. A 
minimal explanation of g is an explanation of g such 
that no strict subset is an explanation of g. 
3 CONVERTING A PFT INTO A 
PHA THEORY 
While converting a PFT into PHA, several aspects 
have to be taken into account: the presence in the 
PFT of different kinds of events (basic events, repli­
cators, etc ... ), the parametric form of the events, the 
logical behavior of gates and the probabilistic charac­
terization of the involved events. Concerning the last 
point, it is worth remembering that in a PHA the­
ory a set of assumptions have to be satisfied, in order 
to perform correct probability computations or esti­
mates. We will return on this point in the following; 
for now, we first provide a conversion from PFT to 
PHA as direct as possible and we show what kind of 
analysis can be performed at that level of conversion. 
Subsequently, we will show how this conversion has to 
be refined, in order to have the PHA theory fulfilling 
basic assumptions leading to a consistent probability 
analysis in terms of abductive explanations. 
Let P be a PFT with events E (basic events BE � E, 
replicator events RE � E), event classes EC, gates Q, 
types T, parameters P and event class failure rates 
R. Let t be the analysis time of the PFT; a PHA 
theory F(t) corresponding to P at time tis generated 
as follows: 
Conversion 1. 
1. for each basic event be(i1, .. . in) E BE and for 
each n-uple (v1, ... vn) with Vj E Ti.;, create a dis­
joint declaration like 
disjoint([be(vJ, ... vn, f) :p,be(v1, . . .  vn,w): 1-p]) 
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where arguments f and w of predicate be stand for 
failed and working behavior of the corresponding 
component respectively and p = 1 - e->-I••Jt 
2. for each gate g E Q, let e(u1, ... un ) E E be the 
output event of g and e; (x1 ... Xn,) 1 ::; i::; m the 
set of m input events for g; 
with 
2.a if g is an OR gate, create m clauses 
e(ul, ... Un) +- e; (xl, ... Xn,, f) if e; E BE 
2.b if g is an AND gate, create a clause 
e(ul ... un) +- h II fz . . .  II fm 
where 
1\(z,, ... z.;) e; (zl .. . Zn. ) if e; E RE, e; If. BE 
1\(z,, ... z.,) e; (Zl· .. zn,,f) if e; E RE, e; E BE 
. _ { Xj if Xj is not declared in e; 
zJ - Vj E fx; if Xj is declared in e; 
If a gate g is of type implicit (k : n) , it is trivial to 
verify that it can be modeled via a set of AND/OR 
gates, so that there is no need to give a specific trans­
lation for it (see [2]). While the conversion of an OR 
gate is quite immediate to understand, the case of the 
AND gate deserves some discussion: indeed, if a repli­
cator is input to an AND gate, the semantics of the 
PFT implies that the conjunction of the set of events 
generated from the replicator (one for each possible 
instantiation of the set of parameters declared in the 
replicator) has to be considered. This is why, if the 
input event e; is a replicator, the body of the clause is 
the conjunction of all the predicates corresponding to 
events generated by each possible instantiation of the 
parameters declared in the replicator. 
Example, Consider the PFT of fig. 2 of the multi­
processor system of fig. 1; suppose that the number 
of disks in each subsystem is m = 2, the number of 
replicated subsystems is n = 3 and that the voting 
mechanism is (2 :  3) (k = 2, n = 3). Suppose also that 
type T1 = {1, 2, 3} (subsystem identities) and that 
type T2 = {1, 2} (disk identities within a subsytem). 
By considering an analysis time t = 10, 000 hours, we 
get the following PHA theory (we use a Prolog-like no­
tation for convenience where ":-" stands for +-, " ," for 
conjunction and upper case letters denotes variables). 
I* Local Memories *I 
disjoint([m (l,w):0.9997,m(l,f):0.0003]) 
disjoint ([m (2,w):0.9997,m(2,f):0.0003]) 
disjoint ([m(3,w):0.9997,m(3,f):0.0003]) 
I* Global Memory *I 
disjoint ([mg(w) :0.9997,mg (f) :0.0003]) 
I* Local Disks *I 
disjoint([d (1,1,w):0.4493,d (1,1,f):0.5507]) 
disjoint([d (1,2,w):0.4493,d (1,2,f) :0.5507]) 
disjoint([d (2,1,w) :0.4493,d(2,1,f):0.5507]) 
disjoint([d(2,2,w) :0.4493,d (2,2,f):0.5507]) 
disjoint([d(3,1,w):0.4493,d(3,1,f):0.5507]) 
disjoint ([d(3,2,w):0.4493,d(3,2,f) :0.5507]) 
I* Processors *I 
disjoint([p(l,w):0.9950,p (l,f):0.0050]) 
disjoint ([p (2,w):0.9950,p (2,f):0.0050]) 
disjoint ([p (3,w) :0.9950,p(3,f):0.0050]) 
I* Global Bus *I 
disjoint([b(w) :0.99998,b (f) :0.00002]) 
mm (I):- mg (f),m(I,f) 
dm (I) :- d (I,l,f) ,d(I,2,f) 
s (I) :- mm (I) 
s (I):- dm(I) 
s (I) :- p (I,f) 
skn:- s(l),s(2) 
skn:- s (l),s(3) 
skn:- s (2),s (3) 
te:- b(f) 
te:- skn 
We can notice that, apart from the disjoint declara­
tions (where each single component of the system has 
to be introduced with its identity) the clauses of the 
theory are almost completely parametric. Parame­
ter instatiation becomes necessary when dealing with 
replicators involved as input of AND gates (and con­
sequently in the case of replicators input to implicit 
(k: n) gates). In the above example, event D(i,j) is 
a replicator for the declared parameter j E T2, input 
to an AND gate with event DM(i) as output. Atom 
d (I, J, f) is used to model the event D(i, j) (we use the 
'f' argument to model the failure, since D(i, j) is a ba­
sic event) and atom dm (I) is introduced to model the 
parametric event DM(i). The AND gate is then mod­
eled through the clause dm (I) : -d (I, 1, f) , d (I, 2, f) 
where the body is the conjunction of atoms d (I, J, f) 
for each possible value of variable J, corresponding to 
the declared parameter j E T2 (i.e. for each possible 
value of T2 = {1,2}). Notice that atoms d (I,l,f) 
and d (I , 2 , f) are still parametric on I, since parame­
ter i, corresponding to PHA variable I, is not declared 
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inside the replicator D ( i, j). The other replica tor in 
the example is event S(i) input to the (2 : 3) gate 
and declaring i; this is modeled by means of the three 
clauses having atom skn (corresponding to event S K N 
in the PFT) in the head. 
4 DETERMINING MINIMAL 
CUT-SETS 
In dependability analysis, the most important quali­
tative measure obtainable fro a FT concerns so called 
Minimal Cut-Sets (MCS); each MCS is a set of basic 
events that is a prime implicant of the TE. MCS corre­
spond to the minimal sets of basic components of the 
modeled system that can be considered responsible of 
a fault. 
The Conversion 1 procedure illustrated in section 3 
is just a re-writing of the gates of a PFT in terms of 
definite clauses, where parameters of the PFT becomes 
variables in the clauses. Basic events are listed in dis­
joint declarations and they form the set of hypotheses 
that can be used to explain a given atom in the corre­
sponding PHA theory. In particular, by explaining the 
atom corresponding to the TE, we can build abductive 
explanations that represent (not necessarily minimal) 
implicants (i.e. cut-sets of the TE). 
In [9], Poole presented a top-down best-first abductive 
procedure for building explanations of a given atom 
whithin PHA3; such a procedure represents an any­
time algorithm able to provide one explanation at the 
time, in order of probability. It can then be adopted 
in order to compute generic cut-sets of the TE, by 
explaining the te atom corresponding to TE. Unfor­
tunately, minimality of explanations cannot be guar­
anteed a priori; on the other hand, Poole's algorithm 
is best-first, using prior probability of explanations as 
evaluation function: a given explanation (cut-set) is 
then generated before any other explanation having 
lower probability. Basic events in a PFT are assumed 
to be mutually independent and this is modeled by the 
fact that in PHA the same assumption holds for atoms 
declared in different disjoint declarations; this means 
that a non-minimal cut-set (i.e. a non-minimal expla­
nation) has certainly lower probability than each MCS 
that it contains. In algorithmic terms, this implies that 
each MCS is always generated before any non-minimal 
cut-set containing it. A simple minimality check can 
then be performed every time a new explanation is 
generated: if there is an already generated explana­
tion which is contained in the current one, then the 
latter is discarded. Using this simple approach we are 
3For the experiments described 
in the present paper we used the code downloaded from 
http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/poole/code.html. 
Table 2: Top 13 MCS and their (prior) unreliability at 
t = 104 hours 
MCS 
{D(1, 1), D(1, 2), D(2, 1), D(2, 2)} 
{D(1, 1),D(1,2),D(3, 1),D(3,2)} 
{D(2, 1), D(2, 2), D(3, 1), D(3, 2)} 
{D(1, 1), D(1, 2), P(2)} 
{D(1, 1), D(1, 2), P(3)} 
{D(2, 1), D(2, 2), P(3)} 
{D(2, 1),D(2,2),P(1)} 
{D(3, 1),D(3,2),P(2)} 
{D(3,1),D(3,2),P(1)} 
{P(1),P(2)} 
{P(1),P(3)} 
{P(2), P(3)} 
{B} 
Prior Prob. 
0.091954 
0.091954 
0.091954 
0.001512 
0.001512 
0.001512 
0.001512 
0.001512 
0.001512 
0.000025 
0.000025 
0.000025 
0.00000003 
able to generate the MCS of the given PFT, by sim­
ply explaning the te atom in the corresponding PHA 
theory provided by Conversion 1. 
In our multiprocessor example, by running Poole's 
top-down search with minimality check, we obtain 28 
MCS. Table 2 reports the top 13 MCS ranked by their 
prior probability computed at time t = 104 hours. 
This represents a quantitative measure used in stan­
dard FT analysis, called the M CS unreliability; as we 
will see in the next section, computing posterior unre­
liability (given that a fault has occurred) can be more 
informative, in order to estimate a precise criticality 
of components. From table 2, we can just notice that 
a disk failure in two subsystems is more probable than 
a disk failure in one subsystem together with a proces­
sor failure in another subsystem, which is more critical 
than a processor failure in two subsystems, which is 
more critical than a bus failure. However, there is no 
precise "weighting" of such criticality, given that the 
system fault has occurred (i.e. given that TE is true). 
It is worth noting that the MCS obtained are not para­
metric, since the hypotheses used in the disjoint dec­
larations are ground atoms. As noticed in [2], having 
parametric cut-sets would reduce the number of ele­
ments to be considered, since a parametric cut-set is a 
representative of a set of cut-sets; however, the compu­
tation of parametric MCS for a PFT is currently still 
an open problem; for example, methods based on the 
translation of the PFT into a Petri net (as proposed in 
[2] provide non-parametric cut-sets like the approach 
described above. 
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5 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In the section 4 we discussed how Conversion 1 can 
be used for qualitative analysis, by exploiting top­
down best-first search on the PHA theory in order to 
compute minimal explanations of the TE, i.e. MCS. 
However, no quantitative analysis can be performed on 
the resulting theory. Indeed, in [10] it is shown that, 
in order to correctly compute (or estimate) posterior 
probabilities of atoms, two basic assumptions have to 
be satisfied by a PHA theory: (1) there are no clauses 
in the theory whose head unifies with a hypothesis; (2) 
if F' is the set of ground instances of the elements 
of the P HA theory F, the bodies of the clauses in F' 
are mutually exclusive. Under both assumptions, min­
imal explanations of conjunctions of atoms are mutu­
ally exclusive; this means that given a conjunction g, if 
expl (g, F) is the set of minimal explanations of g in the 
PHA theory F, the probability of g can be computed 
as 
P(g) = P(ei)· (1) 
e;Eexpl(g,F) 
While the first assumption is satisfied by Conver­
sion 1, the second one is not; for instance, in case 
of an OR gate, input events are independently mod­
eled as predicates in the bodies of separate clauses, 
without any guarantee of mutual exclusion. 
Fortunately, the restriction of assumption (2) is just 
syntactic, since it is possible to rewrite the knowledge 
base in such a way that assumption (2) is satisfied (see 
[10] for the details). 
Conversion 2. 
1. use procedure Conversion 1 to generate a PHA 
theory F1; 
2. transform each set of clauses in F1 having the 
same head into a set of clauses having disjoint 
bodies, following the procedure described in [10] 
and producing a PHA theory F2. 
This process implies the construction of atoms repre­
senting the negation of other atoms; for this reason 
we have to explicitly introduce the working (w) and 
failure status (f)  also for events which are not basic 
events. Using this approach, the PHA theory intro­
duced in section 3 transforms in the following one (we 
omit disjoint declarations that remain unchanged): 
mm (I,f) :- mg(f),m (I,f) 
mm(I, w) :- mg(w) 
mm (I,w) :- m (I,w) ,mg(f) 
dm(I,f) :- d(I,l,f) ,d (I,2,f) 
dm(I,w) :- d (I,l,w) 
dm (I,w) :- d (I,2,w) ,d (I,l,f) 
s(I,f) :- p (I,f) 
s (I,f) :- mm(I,f) ,p (I,w) 
s (I,f) :- dm (I,f) ,mm (I,w) ,p(I,w) 
s (I,w) :- dm (I,w) ,mm (I,w) ,p (I,w) 
skn(f) :- s(l,f) ,s (2,f) 
skn (f) :- s (l,f) ,s(3,f) ,s (2,w) 
skn (f) :- s (2,f) ,s(3,f) ,s (l,w) 
skn(w):- s (l,w) ,s (2,w) 
skn(w):- s (l,w) ,s(3,w) ,s (2,f) 
skn(w):- s (2,w) ,s(3,w),s (l,f) 
te:- b (f) 
te:- skn(f) ,b(w) 
As noticed in [10], this approach biases the most prob­
able explanations to less specific clauses; however, we 
do not aim to use the above model for qualitative pur­
poses, but for quantitative analysis only. In particular 
on the above model, we can exploit top-down best-first 
search to compute arbitrary conditional probability. In 
dependability terms, the most important quantitative 
measure is the system unreliability at timet. This rep­
resents the probability of failure in the system at time 
t. Let F2(t) be the PHA theory produced by Conver­
sion 2 at analysis time t; system unreliability reduces 
to compute the probability of the TE, by explaining 
the corresponding atom te in F2(t): 
P(TE) = P(ei) 
e; Eexpl(te,F2(t)) 
Changing analysis time simply corresponds to change 
probability values in disjoint declarations. Figure 3 
plots the system unreliability of our multiprocessor ex­
ample over time, computed with Poole's algorithm, be­
tween 0 and 20000 hours, with a step of 2000 hours4• 
As discussed in section 4, another important quanti­
tative measure is the MCS unreliability, usually rep­
resented by the joint (prior) probability of the events 
corresponding to the cut-set: it is computed by as­
suming the independence of the failure events of sys­
tem components. As show in [3], considering poste­
rior probabilities of events given that a system failure 
has occurred, can provide a more reliable analysis of 
the criticality of system components; in [3] we showed 
that, in case of a standard FT, the use of BN poste­
rior probability computation can be suitably adopted 
for this aspect. In case of a PFT model, the corre­
sponding PHA theory F2(t) obtained by Conversion 
2 at timet can be used in a similar way. If Cis a MCS 
and c is the conjunction of atoms corresponding to C 
in the PHA theory, because of equation (1), posterior 
4These results have been verified by performing the 
same computation on the BN corresponding to the un­
folded versions (at different times) of the PFT of fig. 2, 
through the JavaBayes tool [5] 
(http://www.pmr.poli.usp.br/ltd/Software/javabayes). 
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Table 3: Top 13 MCS and their posterior unreliability 
at t = 104 hours 
MCS 
{D(1, 1), D(1,2), D(2, 1), D(2,2)} 
{D(1, 1), D(1,2), D(3, 1), D(3, 2)} 
{D(2, 1), D(2,2),D(3, 1),D(3, 2)} 
{ D(1, 1), D(1, 2), P(2)} 
{ D(1, 1), D(1, 2), P(3)} 
{D(2, 1),D(2, 2), P(3)} 
{ D(2, 1), D(2, 2), P(1)} 
{D(3, 1),D(3, 2), P(2)} 
{D(3, 1),D(3,2), P(1)} 
{P(1), P(2)} 
{P(1), P(3)} 
{P(2), P(3)} 
{B} 
Post. Unreliab. 
0.409541 
0.409541 
0.409541 
0.006736 
0.006736 
0.006736 
0.006736 
0.006736 
0.006736 
0.000111 
0.000111 
0.000111 
0.000089 
unreliability of C can be computed as 
?(CITE)= 2:e,Eexpt((cAte),F2(t)) 
P(e;) 
2:e;Eexpl(te,F2(t)) P(ej) 
Table 3 shows the top 13 MCS of the example with 
their posterior unreliability at t = 104 hours. We can 
notice that, while the ranking of MCS does not change 
with respect to table 2, now the quantitative measure 
computed (i.e the posterior probability of each MCS 
given the TE) is an effective weight of their criticality 
with respect to the system fault. For instance, we 
can now state that there is about 40% of probability 
that, in case of system fault, disk failures in two sub­
sytems are the responsible for the fault. Notice that, 
since MCS are implicants of the TE, the conditional 
probability of TE given a MCS is 1, so the posterior 
of a MCS given the TE differs from the prior only 
for the constant P(T E)-1. Even if such values are in 
principle computable also with FT analysis (after the 
PFT 
Conversionl 
,--'--�make disjointr-....L..---, 
Fl bodies F2 
Figure 4: Using PHA for PFT analysis 
computation of the probability of the TE), FT-based 
tools usually just report the information of table 25. 
Figure 4 epitomizes the whole approach: from a given 
PFT, by means of Conversion 1 a PHA theory F1 
is generated from which MCS can be obtained; from 
F1, by making bodies of clauses disjoint, we get a new 
theory F2 from which quantitative analysis can be per­
formed. Conversion 2 is then represented by the se­
quential application of the steps corresponding to the 
two bold arrows. Dashed arrows represent possible in­
puts. In particular the analysis time t is fundamental 
for quantitative analysis using F2, but is necessary to 
F1 as well; indeed, since best-first search of MCS on 
F1 uses prior probabilities of hypotheses, we need to 
compute a value of such probabilities using a given 
analysis time. MCS may then be used as input to 
quantitative analysis (for example for computing their 
posterior unreliability). 
Of course, any kind of posterior probability computa­
tion can be performed on F2, by making possible dif­
ferent kind of diagnostic inferences usually neglected 
in classical dependability analysis. For instance, we 
can analyse the criticality of each single component by 
computing the posterior probability of each basic event 
given the TE. Table 4 reports the results obtained by 
running the posterior computation algorithm at time 
t = 104 hours. Notice that, differently from posterior 
unreliability of MCS, these values cannot be computed 
by just normalizing prior probabilities using TE prob­
ability. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Parametric modeling of redundant systems is funda­
mental in dependability analysis, since it provides a 
5Some recent works on FT analysis address the impor­
tance of posterior probability computation as well (see [6]). 
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Table 4: . Posterior probabilities of basic events at 
timet= 104 hours (i E T1,j E T2). 
Basic Event 
D(i,j) 
P(i) 
M(i) 
Mg 
B 
Posterior Prob. 
0.8074582 
0.0115368 
3.001e-4 
3.003e-4 
8.91e-5 
compact system representation; PFT have been pro­
posed as a way to achieve such a compactness. In the 
present paper we have related PFT to the PHA for­
malism, where the parametric representation can be 
partially preserved. The use of search algorithms on 
a PHA theory can be effectively used to compute re­
liability measures, both qualitative and quantitative; 
this provides an analysis approach to PFT at the para­
metric level. 
Since PHA is a generalization of BN to a first-order 
language, several advantages can be obtained with re­
spect to standard FT analysis (as also discussed in 
[3, 4]), in particular with respect to posterior proba­
bility computation. Some other researchers have pre­
viously investigated the use of BN formalisms for re­
liability [1, 12, 1 1], however they always consider non 
parametric models. 
Another advantage of PHA is that top-down search 
can be performed in any-time fashion [9]; while for the 
example used in this paper we always computed exact 
values, for more complex systems it may be more rea­
sonable to just estimate reliability measures. Poole's 
algorithm can be stopped at any time and the current 
probability estimate provided as output; for example 
we can stop the computation of the system unrelia­
bility after a given number of explanations of the TE 
have been computed or when the estimation error is 
below a given threshold. 
Finally, we did not discuss here some modeling advan­
tages that may be provided by PHA with respect to 
plain PFT that are of the same nature of those ob­
tainable from a BN with respect to a simple FT: they 
range from noisy gates, to multi-state variables, to se­
quentially dependent faults (see [3, 4] for more details). 
Our future works will concentrate on defining a prin­
cipled way with which such aspects can be fruitfully 
exploited whithin PHA. 
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